Lebanon’s fragile political landscape is being tested once again. Decades of economic collapse, sectarian tension, and regional interference have left the country vulnerable, and the latest conflict with Israel has put Hezbollah, one of Lebanon’s most powerful actors, under unprecedented strain. Understanding how Hezbollah’s position might evolve requires a close look at the pillars that underpin its influence within Lebanon, pillars that were already showing signs of weakness before the war and now face even greater pressure.

Hezbollah’s power in Lebanon depends on three main pillars, each of which was already weakening before the war with Israel and now faces even greater pressure. To understand how the war may affect Hezbollah’s position in Lebanon, one must understand these pillars.

First, Hezbollah provides key social services to the Shia community, including hospitals, health centers, free insurance, and schools that fill gaps historically left by the state.[1] Beyond that, Hezbollah is consistently successful in providing civil service job placements to supporters, while also supporting cultural and life events like weddings and funerals. This system is backed by Iranian funding and Hezbollah’s influence over Lebanese institutions, including leadership in the health and financial ministries.[2] These services have helped Hezbollah win loyalty by embedding itself in nearly every part of Shia life.

However, this pillar is weakening. U.S. sanctions on Iran and Hezbollah’s regional activities have cut funding by nearly $280 million, triggering austerity measures like salary cuts and layoffs.[3] Even though Hezbollah strongholds fared slightly better than other areas during the 2020 crisis, the economic pressure has still sparked doubts about its leadership.[3]

The second pillar is the protector narrative, or the idea of “resistance.” Over time, Hezbollah has worked to shift its image from a militant group to a legitimate armed force within Lebanon, one that rivals and has delegitimized the Lebanese Armed Forces due to its battlefield successes and disciplined fighters.[4] But this pillar has started to erode. The long-running conflict in Syria forced Hezbollah to recruit more fighters, many of whom lacked the same level of ideological commitment and military training, which hurt effectiveness, morale, and recruitment.[4] These setbacks, combined with significant losses such as the Pager explosions and the death of Hassan Nasrallah, have left the group weaker, less effective, and increasingly questioned by its own base.

The third pillar is rooted in Shia identity and serves as the ideological bridge to Iran and its doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih.[5] This draws on historic Shia beliefs about struggle and sacrifice, going back to the martyrdom of Hussain.[5] This pillar is often emphasized during times of crisis, but as the other pillars weaken, its influence fades as well. Shia supporters are increasingly disillusioned by Hezbollah’s failures, and as their frustration and concerns become more public, it encourages others to voice their own discontent.[6][7]

Shia Hezbollah supporters in Lebanon are at a turning point: they will either continue backing Hezbollah through the ongoing crisis with Israel or grow tired of the constant strain and look for alternatives. As support slips, protests calling for changes to Lebanon’s sectarian political system seem increasingly likely. Whether such protests lead to meaningful change in Hezbollah’s role or in the broader government is uncertain; what is clear is that any major shift will destabilize an already fragile country.

Lebanon’s larger political climate only heightens this pressure. Economic concerns dominate in Lebanon, with 61% of the population citing it as their top issue. 89% believe corruption is widespread, and 41% would emigrate because of it.[8] Even more telling, 56% of citizens now favor a new secular system of government, while only 10% want to maintain the current sectarian structure.[9]

Based on this, the war with Israel is likely to speed up Hezbollah’s political unraveling. Funds will be diverted to weapons instead of welfare. Poorly trained fighters facing U.S.-grade weapons will likely produce high casualties, and Hezbollah’s arguably most important tool, popular support, is at risk. Today they rule more by consent than force, but if the bloodshed continues, public patience is going to break.

Ghaddar captures the divide well: in Dahiya, streets are filled with memorials and families in deep poverty mourning their losses, while just across the city in Ghobeiry, Hezbollah’s elite live in comfort.[10] Yet these supporters have few alternatives. Amal is fading. Cross-sectarian alliances are unlikely. The most viable alternative may be a shift toward secular government, which over half of Lebanese now say they want.[11] While this may seem unlikely to happen in the short term, Lebanese citizens only have to look next door to Syria to see how seemingly easy change can be.

If Hezbollah’s internal legitimacy continues to unravel under the strain of war, its position within Lebanon’s political system will become harder to sustain. This could open space for new political actors, intensify calls for a secular state, and potentially weaken the power-sharing system that has defined Lebanese politics. In short, if Hezbollah is shaken, so is the entire political framework of Lebanon.

Those who argue that Shia discontent will not seriously damage Hezbollah’s legitimacy often point to Israel. They are not wrong; many Hezbollah supporters will never condemn the group, blaming Israel alone for every death rather than questioning why their relatives were fighting in the first place. Martyrdom is a core part of Hezbollah’s identity, with its very name, “Party of God,” reinforcing that. For many, the loss of a family member will be framed solely as an Israeli crime.

But a shift is still possible. Even as people continue to blame Israel, they have also started recognizing Hezbollah’s role. These views are not mutually exclusive. One can blame Israel for antagonizing and still fault Hezbollah for sending undertrained men into battle, and for making military service one of the only economic options during a financial collapse.

Hezbollah’s future in Lebanon is no longer assured. The strain of war, economic collapse, and internal disillusionment threatens the very pillars that have sustained its power. What happens next will not only reshape Hezbollah’s role but could redefine Lebanese politics more broadly. As public patience erodes and calls for secular governance grow louder, the country faces a rare window for political transformation—one that could challenge entrenched sectarian structures and open space for new actors to emerge. Lebanon’s democracy, already fragile, hangs in the balance.

Gabriella Jenson is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Democracy and Governance at Georgetown University, with previous dual Bachelor’s degrees in Political Science and Political Communication from Louisiana State University.

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Endnotes

[1] Hanin Ghaddar, Hezbollahland: Mapping Dahiya and Lebanon’s Shia Community (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2022).

[2] Ghaddar, Hezbollahland.

[3] Ghaddar, Hezbollahland.

[4] Lina Khatib, Hezbollah: Mobilization and Power (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2021).

[5] Ghaddar, Hezbollahland.

[6] Khatib, Hezbollah.

[7] Ghaddar, Hezbollahland.

[8] Arab Barometer, “Lebanon Country Report,” 2021.

[9] Arab Barometer, “Lebanon Country Report,” 2021.

[10] Ghaddar, Hezbollahland.

[11] Arab Barometer, “Lebanon Country Report,” 2021.