Guest Column: The Year of Elections in Asia

D&S Editorial Board
10–16 minutes

Introducing: A new guest column series from Democracy & Society on recent elections in Asia in their implications for democracy in the world.

In this series, authors submit commentary and analysis on elections in Asia. Submissions in this series speak the economic situation, political environment, global waves of populism, and more.

Indonesia’s 2024 Election: Democracy at a Crossroads

Jake Hanson, M.A. Candidate in Democracy in Governance, Georgetown University

Colloquially termed the “Year of Elections”, 2024 yielded significant challenges to democratic practices across the world. Even as voter turnout reached record levels across the board, many of the succeeding actors pose an inherent threat to the survival of these democracies and the institutions that seek to keep executive powers in check.

On February 14, 2024, former minister of defense Prabowo Subianto succeeded president Joko Widodo in becoming Indonesia’s eighth president. A controversial figure, surrounded both by allegations and convictions of human rights abuse, Prabowo rose to the country’s highest office with almost 60% of voters behind him[1]. Some attribute this in part due to his choice in running mate, former President Widodo’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka[2]. Despite Raka, 37, being below the minimum age to run for national office, Indonesia’s Supreme Court – led by Widodo’s brother-in-law – ruled to change the requirement so Raka could remain on the ticket[3].

Erosion of Rights and Military Infringement

Democratic ideals and institutions were significantly eroded during former President Widodo’s time in office, in tandem with the infringement of the military into domestic political affairs and a decline in the capabilities of watchdog media. Inherently through Raka succeeding as Vice President, it could also be viewed as the construction of a political dynasty. Prabowo is expected to cut thousands of local legislative positions and solve problems through use of physical force without going through democratic channels[4].

Digital Media and the Spread of Disinformation

Indonesia’s electorate, composed of some 204 million registered voters, utilizes an open-list proportional system to select leaders to the national legislature and to local councils, while the presidency is obtained through popular vote[5]. Prabowo, one of the three leading candidates, faced former governors of Jakarta and Central Java, Anies Baswedan and Ganjar Pranowo. While investigations into the final results did not yield significant results, reports have circulated of the use of political “buzzers” in assisting Prabowo’s third and only successful campaign. The Center for Strategic and International Studies[6] describes buzzers as: “recruited individuals managing fake social media profiles, which amplify messages to influence and manipulate public opinion under clients’ orders.” (Seah, 2024). This is not the first time political candidates have used buzzers to gain popular support, but the threat to the democratic process is exacerbated by Prabowo’s position on key foreign policy issues and his vision for Indonesia moving forward.

Implications for Democracy and Foreign Relations

Prabowo’s rise to power despite accusations of human rights violations while serving as a general in the military is an ominous omen for the future of democracy in Indonesia. The role of public media and local journalism must be reinforced and supported by international actors in order to fulfill their role as watchdogs over the institutions that would seek to infringe upon the rights of the people they are meant to protect. The dominant power in Southeast Asia, Indonesia has the opportunity to present itself as a beacon of what democratic institutions can offer to the rest of the region; or can serve as an extension of backsliding demonstrated through Prabowo’s and Widodo’s consolidation of power[7]. Having expressed disdain and dissatisfaction in foreign relationships with the United States and Japan, coupled with recent events in the United States including the foreign aid freeze, leaves the door open for China to step in and fill the gaps where others could not.

[1] Karmini, N. (2024, March 20). Prabowo Subianto’s election as Indonesia’s next president is official. Why is it being challenged? Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/indonesia-president-election-challenge-explainer-4148eee7cd0c239a49624b8c6d119db3

[2] Teresia, A., & Lamb, K. (2024, February 16). Indonesian president’s son also rises, but what will his role as new VP be?Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/indonesian-presidents-son-also-rises-what-will-his-role-new-vp-be-2024-02-16/

[3] Kurlantzick, Joshua. “A Big Year for Asian Elections, but Not Necessarily for Democracy.” Council on Foreign Relations, 12 Dec. 2024, www.cfr.org/expert-brief/big-year-asian-elections-not-necessarily-democracy

[4] Kurlantzick, J. (2024, February 14). Prabowo Wins. Does Indonesian Democracy Lose? Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/blog/prabowo-wins-does-indonesian-democracy-lose

[5] Shidiq, R., Liu, D., & Yeung, J. (2024, February 9). Zooming in on the Digital Aspects of the Indonesian Elections 2024. Oxford Internet Institute. https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/news-events/zooming-in-on-the-digital-aspects-of-the-indonesian-elections-2024/

[6] Seah, N. (2024, December 17). Democracy in the Digital Age: How Buzzer Culture is Stinging Indonesia’s Democracy. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/democracy-digital-age-how-buzzer-culture-stinging-indonesias-democracy

[7] Kurlantzick, Joshua. “Indonesia’s Presidential Election: The Old Guard Faces the New.” Council on Foreign Relations, 12 Jan. 2024, www.cfr.org/blog/indonesias-presidential-election-old-guard-faces-new.

Sri Lanka’s 2024 Elections: A Turning Point for Democracy?

Lily Ashbrook, M.A. Candidate in Democracy in Governance, Georgetown University and Gauri Kaushik, M.A. Candidate in Democracy in Governance, Georgetown University

In 2022, Sri Lanka’s inflation rate surged dramatically from 7% in 2021, to an alarming 49.7%. This sharp rise was driven by a combination of factors, including widespread corruption, mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, defaults on international loans, and poor governance. The country plunged into its worst economic crisis since gaining independence in 1948.

The effects were devastating: power outages became frequent, food and fuel shortages intensified, and essential services such as buses and ambulances were unable to operate due to a lack of fuel. As the shortage worsened, prices spiraled even higher, forcing schools to close, and workers were urged to stay at home in an effort to conserve resources.

The suffering of the population led to mass protests in the streets of Colombo, with citizens from all religions, ethnicities, and generations demanding accountability from their government. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, his brother Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa, and their other brother, Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa were to blame. Their concentration of power in the Sri Lankan government made it clear where to point the finger.

The Aragalaya (suffering) protests of 2022, was a movement of unprecedented scale. Activists came together to demand the political change they so desperately sought. With widespread support, hundreds of thousands of people marched through Colombo, fueling a nationwide outcry. What began as a series of protests in March only grew as frustrations mounted, and with the lack of a responsive government, the demonstrations continued for months. 

The demand for basic necessities soon turned into a revolt against the Rajapaksa dynasty. In July, the protests escalated when demonstrators stormed both the president’s residence and the prime minister’s. Shortly thereafter, the Rajapaksa brothers fled the country and the presidency fell to Ranil Wikramesinghe.  Although Sri Lanka’s government continued to be ruled by the Rajapaksa’s Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) under Wickremesinghe, the Aragalaya protests marked the first significant change to an executive branch long dominated by the same political families and parties. In 2022, the people of Sri Lanka made it clear they were ready for change. By 2024, that change was realized through democratic elections, further reshaping the country’s political landscape.

The 2024 Sri Lankan elections were marked by several historic milestones. On September 21, Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the National People’s Power (NPP) party made an unprecedented rise, becoming the country’s tenth president. This election was the first time in Sri Lankan history in which no candidate secured an outright majority on the first round, leading to a runoff between the top two candidates. 42.31% of voters placed their trust in Dissanayake, choosing him as an alternative to the traditional political establishment.

Elected over elites like Wikramesinghe and Mahinda Rajapakse’s son, Dissanayake’s victory symbolized the Sri Lankan people’s rejection of the entrenched political establishment that had dominated the country’s politics for decades. In the subsequent parliamentary elections held on November 14, the NPP witnessed a meteoric rise, going from having only three members in the previous parliament to winning a two thirds majority in the new one and becoming the first single party in the country’s history to do so.

Dissanayake and the NPP’s campaign successfully appealed to a broad spectrum of voters, including those from minority communities, signaling an important shift towards a more inclusive political discourse in a country that has been defined by ethnic conflict. Until their defeat in 2009, the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) controlled Tamil-majority areas in the north and fought the Sinhalese-dominated Sri Lankan Army in a violent civil war that lasted nearly three decades. Notably, the NPP, a Sinhalese party, performed remarkably well in Tamil-dominated areas. The NPP beat out regional Tamil parties for the first time in many of these districts, including Jaffna and Vanni, former LTTE strongholds. Their reach with Tamil voters shows the widespread disillusionment with regional parties that center ethnic identity and could be a move towards a more united country.

The parliamentary elections were significant not only because of this political shift, but also because of the demographic changes within the new legislature. A record 21 women were elected as Members of Parliament (MPs), the highest level of female representation in the country’s history. In addition, a majority of the new MPs are young, first-time lawmakers, emphasizing the rapid shift towards a new political landscape. The influx of fresh voices and perspectives reflects the growing demand for change among the electorate and signals a departure from the older political guard that has long dominated Sri Lankan politics.

In a country devastated by ethnic division, violence, and economic crisis for much of its young life, these elections and their historical outcomes represent a new start for Sri Lanka’s democracy. Dissanayake’s pro-working class and anti-political elite message undeniably garnered widespread support, overcoming ethnic, religious, and social divides. Yet, with a new party controlling both the legislative and executive branches with an overwhelming majority, proponents of Sri Lankan democracy should remain observant and wary of a weakened opposition and democratic institutions. Despite its promises, the NPP’s rise to power may prove to further deepen ethnic division and attacks on the rights of working class people. While these elections may have symbolized the desire of the Sri Lankan people to move past ethnic conflict and economic crisis, the fledgling democracy will continue to face challenges as it evolves.

The elections and their outcomes embodied the spirit of the Aragalaya uprising and its call for systemic change. This could be a promising development for the country’s electoral system and democratic future, as it demonstrated the power of the people’s voice and a shift towards addressing long-standing issues of governance, corruption, and ethnic division. However, the journey towards a robust democracy is ongoing. Pro-democracy actors must remain vigilant and actively involved in advancing and safeguarding democratic institutions. Despite the positive changes, challenges persist, including threats to civil liberties and the rule of law. At its core, Sri Lankan democracy and the essence of the Aragalaya must continue to be upheld by the Sri Lankan people, rather than passed on to a government that could easily concentrate power despite the hopes it represents.

Bangladesh’s 2024 Election: Right to Rule in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes

Alex Szabowicz, M.A. Candidate in Democracy in Governance, Georgetown University

The concept of a government’s right to rule is dependent upon elections. The right to rule is based on its legitimacy and ability to protect the social order. In Bangladesh, the January election revealed a lack of legitimacy, and the summer protests let out grievances with the social order. 

The Election & Its Consequences:

In January, Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina won re-election a fourth time with only 40% of eligible voters participating, leading to boycotts from major opposition parties.  With the economy in limbo, Hasina faced calls to resign. Consequently, the election did not provide Hasina with the solid margin needed to cement the legitimacy of the Awami League’s power and reaffirm the authoritarian right to rule.1

The Awami League has maintained its power by controlling Bangladesh’s Parliament –the Sangsad– and the Presidency since 2008. All executive authority lies with Hasina, who has occupied the office of Prime Minister since. However, while weaker than the Prime Minister, the President’s authority lies in appointing Justices to the judiciary. This is a critical power as the Justices presiding on Ohidul Islam and others v. The Government of Bangladesh and others were both appointed by Awami League Presidents. The ruling of this case instituted the quota system for government hires, specifically requiring five percent of hires to be Freedom Fighters.2 This was the tipping point for student protests this past summer.  

The employment of the quota system mobilized peaceful protests by students in opposition. The government cracked down harshly, killing hundreds and refusing to take accountability. While the abuse of state powers had gone on for years, the brutality of these protests intensified public attention to these injustices. Protests were further exacerbated when police shot Abu Sayed while peacefully protesting. His death made him a martyr and a rallying point for students.

Protests turned into riots and violence gradually mounted on both sides. Eventually, the students forced government forces to concede and a new wave of leadership arrived in Dhaka. This revolution highlights the key failures of Bangladesh’s political parties to hear the will of the people. The weakness of governance in Bangladesh underlines the ability to create democratic change in other competitive authoritarian states given the breakdown in the right to rule.3

Right To Rule

The theory of the mandate to rule centers around the legitimacy of government achieved through proper social order. Authority is not sacred and can lose its validity; and if the equalitarian system is significantly disrupted, the general population loses faith in the ability of the state to provide for the social order.4

The AL never solidified the social trust that was achieved by the freedom fighters in the 1970s. Social trust must be earned and fostered by the regime with legitimacy. Social trust was lacking in the early years of Bangladesh, with military regimes and the AL not living up to their proclaimed ideals. Trust takes decades, if not centuries, to build and yet only a few years to destroy.5 The Awami League’s failure is demonstrated by the public perception of the AL decreasing dramatically year over year; from 2019-2022, perceptions saw a 26% decrease in positive impressions of democracy.6 

Sheikh Hasina needed a stronger right to rule. The validity of the elections was dubious at best and meager voter turnout only demonstrated her unpopularity. This mix of low societal trust, general outrage, and mass mobilization by the Bangladeshi students created the ultimate storm to oust Hasina.7

While events in Bangladesh have gone unnoticed by the international community, the potential for change in the country is massive. The Awami League maintained their almost two decades of power with an iron fist and now that they are ousted, legitimate and competitive democracy may emerge. The January election laid the foundations with a demonstration of a lack of legitimacy. The quota ruling and the economic hardship were the catalysts that altered the social order. They have made it possible for Bangladesh to consolidate democracy by strengthening social order, rebuilding legitimacy, and earning the right to rule by the people.8 

  1. Chen, Heather, and Vedika Sud. “Sheikh Hasina: Bangladesh Prime Minister Secures Fourth Term in Election Boycotted by Opposition.” CNN, Cable News Network, 8 Jan. 2024, http://www.cnn.com/2024/01/06/asia/bangladesh-2024-election-opposition-boycott-intl-hnk/index.html. ↩︎
  2.  “কোটা বাতিল অবৈধ ঘোষণা করা হাইকোর্টের রায়ে যা বলা হয়েছে.” Bangla Tribune, Bangla Tribune, 12 July 2024, ↩︎
  3.  CIMA, STEVE, et al. South Asia’s Political Parties Need Internal Reforms to Revitalize Regional Democracy. Atlantic Council, 2024. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep62788. Accessed 23 Oct. 2024. ↩︎
  4.  Bendix, Reinhard. “The Mandate to Rule: An Introduction.” Social Forces, vol. 55, no. 2, 1976, pp. 242–56. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/2576222. Accessed 28 Oct. 2024. ↩︎
  5.  Svendsen, Gunnar Lind Haase, et al. “Explaining the Emergence of Social Trust: Denmark and Germany.” Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung, vol. 37, no. 3 (141), 2012, pp. 351–67. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/41636612. Accessed 24 Oct. 2024. ↩︎
  6.  “The State of Bangladesh’s Political Governance, Development, and Society: According to Its Citizens.” The Asia Foundation, 27 Sept. 2024, asiafoundation.org/publication/survey-of-the-bangladeshi-people-a-democracy-perception-survey-2022/. ↩︎
  7.  Corea, Harindrini, and Nazia Erum. “What Is Happening at the Quota-Reform Protests in Bangladesh?” Amnesty International, 2 Aug. 2024, http://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/07/what-is-happening-at-the-quota-reform-protests-in-bangladesh/ ↩︎
  8.  “Bangladesh: Freedom in the World 2024 Country Report.” Freedom House, 2024, freedomhouse.org/country/bangladesh/freedom-world/2024. ↩︎