by Katja Volz

A recent article in The Economist equated the use of ethnic division in the War in Ukraine to the Balkan wars of the 90s. Stating that “unscrupulous political entrepreneurs won or cemented power by stirring up ethnic paranoia,”^[i] the author’s comparison mirrors the theory of constructivism. 

Constructivist theory substantiates the assertion that ethnic identities can be constructed and affected by politics as well as through shared, traumatic experiences among members of these groups. Political elites mobilize ethnic groups using nationalist sentiments to gain legitimacy and preserve power, and these divides are further strengthened by conflict.^[ii] The theory assumes that ethnic cleavages are not fixed but can be reconstructed through political means,^[iii] exploring the role of the state, power, and interests in notions of norms, identity, boundaries, culture, and civil society.^[iv] While the constructivist theory does not ignore historical ethnic and cultural identities, it underscores their fluidity and the influence of political actors on the modern reconstruction of these identities. Despite differences in the approach to understanding and accepting constructivist legacies, most agree that ethnic and cultural differences are a fundamental barrier to reconciliation. 

Using a similar tactic to Putin, the political elites and structures in the former Yugoslavia constructed ethnic identities and encouraged conflict and hatred in Serbia and Croatia. Political actors rallied support and justified their strategies for political gain by manipulating ethnic divides when they were confronted with the threat of diverse and plural communities. Their goal was to demobilize these groups to protect their interests and deflect economic and political liberalization. The division and hatred between Serbians and Croatians have persisted even long after the war ended, and this phenomenon is evident in other conflicts such as the Ukraine War. 

After World War II, the Yugoslav regime was led by Josip Broz Tito, whose anti-Soviet leadership was regarded by some as having more liberal tendencies, in some respects, in comparison to other communist regimes. Tito did maintain a police state and displayed harsh repression of some ethnic groups, particularly Albanians, while he simultaneously tried to inspire national unity of the Yugoslav republics. Under socialist rule, state institutions were operated mirroring the ethnic structure of the country. The government reflected, though disproportionately, representatives from all the republics and autonomous provinces.^[v]

Serbians were the largest ethnic group throughout Yugoslavia prior to the war, encompassing 40% of the population.^[vi] The republics were heterogeneous, and each republic’s population was comprised of 20-30% minority groups. Despite these supposed stable structures, Tito also ignored some of the groups’ grievances, which he rejected and repressed using the rhetoric of brotherhood.^[vii] Additionally, his efforts to distribute ethnic groups posed the risk of discrimination against minorities. There were also shortfalls in the success of a heterogenous government as some demands of minority groups were still not met due to the majoritarian nature of the arrangement. After Tito’s death in 1980, the political landscape in Yugoslavia began to shift. In the 80s, some of the republics were able to strengthen their economic and political resources, weakening the federal structure of Yugoslavia. 

Franjo Tuđman took power in 1990, becoming the President in Croatia’s first parliamentary elections after the fall of communism. Both he and Serbia’s President, Slobodan Milošević, used expansionist policies to manipulate ethnic groups for their gain and to impose authority over minority groups. Before the conflict, the ethnic populations were able to exist and function heterogeneously. Once the war began, minority groups in the republics experienced violence and segregation despite the relatively peaceful environment that existed previously.^[viii] While Croatia was attempting to decentralize, Serbia wanted to centralize the republics and rejected a unilateral secession. Serbia did not have a strong economy or resources compared with Croatia, which was more industrious and had a flourishing tourist economy. This drove Serbia’s attempt to create a new state by utilizing a majority in the Yugoslav National Army, where the Serbs were overrepresented and had the capacity to instigate violence.^[ix] As a result, Serbia and Croatia’s ethnic cleavages intensified, causing a shift in ethnic boundaries, and hardening the population’s perceptions – constructed by the regimes – of one another. 

The Serbs living in Croatia made up 12-15% of the population. To encourage the repression and removal of the minority, Croatia rewrote its constitution to claim Croatia as the homeland of the Croatian nation, rather than the “national state of the Croatian nation and the state of the Serbian nation in Croatia.”^[x] To further alienate them, Serbs were removed from their jobs, the national language was declared Croatian, and they rescinded the official status of the Cyrillic alphabet. 

The construction and hardening of ethnic conflict between the Serbs and Croats continued to be reinforced by both Tuđman and Milošević as the war escalated. The leaders used nationalist rhetoric and propaganda through state-controlled media to villainize one another and justify the violence and ethnic cleansing. They vindicated their actions, claiming they were defending their citizens, and Croatia especially denied carrying out war crimes against the Serbs. Additionally, the Bosnian Muslims living in both Serbia and Croatia became repressed minorities, with no state in which Muslims were a majority ethnicity.^[xi] Serbia and Croatia both pursued expansionist tendencies against the Bosnian Muslims. This conflict led to a three-person presidency in Bosnia, a bicameral legislature and two substructures, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.^[xii] These structures created further ethnic cleavages and Serbian dominance, which continue today as the arrangement has not changed and the legacy of ethnic hatred between the countries persists. Croatia declared independence in 1991 and began the attempt to transition to democracy despite the ongoing conflict. However, Tuđman’s regime continued to display authoritarian tendencies and aggravated ethnic divides.

The repercussions of the construction of nationalist homogenous states and entrenched ethnic identities in former Yugoslavia endure today. Despite the legacy of hostility, Croatia continues to transition to a more consolidated democracy, and Serbia’s current President, Aleksandar Vučić, claims aspirations for amicable relations between the two countries. He has rejected the idea of a “Greater Serbia” as unproductive and implausible. However, Serbia has struggled to reckon with its past and make advances in international relations, particularly EU negotiations, as the regime is still unwilling to recognize war crimes and is unrelenting in its rejection of Kosovo’s independence. Croatia has been hesitant to endorse Serbian EU membership because of tensions such as the ongoing migrant crisis, lack of compliance with the protection of minorities and cooperation with the UN war crimes.^[xiii]

Civil society relations and tolerance between ethnic groups in Croatia and Serbia have had inconsistent rates of intolerance. A 2019 study found that approximately 19% of citizens are reluctant to live with or beside a person of a different ethnicity from successor states.^[xiv] Another study found that some of the younger generation’s perceptions of one another display greater hostility toward their neighbors than the older generation who endured the violence. Unfortunately, at the same time, the population of Serbs in Croatia has substantially decreased, which may play a role in these perceptions.^[xv] Another study examined religious tensions between the Orthodox, Catholic, and Muslim groups. While the study found that 85-98% of respondents were likely to accept members of other religions as citizens of their countries and as neighbors, the survey showed that there was less willingness to integrate different religions into their families.^[xvi] Despite the claims of tolerance of other religions, there are still significant portions of the population that believe religion is very important. In Serbia, 59% of people say it is very important to be Orthodox to be considered a “true Serbian”.^[xvii] General public trust remains low across all states and feelings of superiority persist. Nevertheless, it is promising that as time goes on, the trends show incremental progress toward reconciliation and acceptance.

Although there has been a gradual improvement in civil society relations, there is still low confidence among the public in political institutions as elite-level politicians continue to alienate groups and traditions in civil society.^[xviii] There are still weak party systems, fragmentation along ethnic lines within government, and extensive international intervention.^[xix] Overall, despite evident tensions, the political developments between Serbia and Croatia have demonstrated increasing cooperation and collaboration, and an unlikely relapse into another conflict. As the trauma and resentment of the war subside and younger, more educated groups mature, there is hope for long-term peace between the ethnic groups. 

That being said, to address the enduring conflict it is crucial for entities and communities to invest in the growth and unification of the nation. Schools, workplaces, and political institutions must incorporate policies conducive to the evolving nature of multiethnic narratives. These may include firmer anti-discrimination laws, quotas, and educational initiatives around ethnic and cultural diversity and tolerance.  

At a fundamental level, leaders and citizens must ask themselves: What more can be done to foster greater inclusivity and unity to prevent future hatred and cleavages in the Balkans?

Katja Volz is a second year student in the Democracy and Governance MA program at Georgetown University. She is half Croatian and grew up in Boulder, Colorado. Her studies and research have focused on democratization, corruption, and international development with a regional focus on Eastern Europe, specifically the Balkans and the legacy of the Yugoslavia War. Katja graduated with a BA in Sociology from The University of British Columbia in 2016.

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_{ⁱⁱⁱ Kürşat Çınar, “Dismemberment of Yugoslavia: Lessons for the Ethnic Conflict Literature,” Balkan Journal of Social Sciences 8, no. 15 (January 2019): 16, https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/670647.}

_{^[iv] Frank Wilmer. “The Social Construction of Conflict and Reconciliation in the Former Yugoslavia.” Social Justice . 25, no. 4. (Winter 1998).}

_{^[xviii] Çınar. “Dismemberment of Yugoslavia.”}

_{^[xix] Igor Ilic. “Croatia, Serbia try to improve ties after decades of tension.” Reuters. Published February 12, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-croatia-serbia/croatia-serbia-try-to-improve-ties-after-decades-of-tension-idUSKBN1FW1N1.}