Russell Porter was Deputy Director for the Central America and Mexico Office at USAID. He served as a Director on the National Security Council and is an expert on Latin American affairs and security. 

The New Autocrats

Across the world, a new breed of leaders is emerging: people who win elections handily, then use their popularity to dismantle the very institutions that brought them to power. They argue that high approval ratings and winning an election give them license to rewrite constitutions, sideline courts, and muzzle critics. The Trump Administration has embraced this approach in forging allies, but it is fraught with both short and long-term problems for U.S. foreign policy.

Populist leaders will often claim that “I am the people,” equating an electoral victory with an everlasting mandate to govern unchecked. Popularity is temporal, and history has demonstrated that stable governance rests on the separation of powers, protecting minority rights, and preserving the institutions that ensure a level playing field, so no leader is above the law. 

The United States has promoted liberal democracy as a way to ensure we are aligned with and engaged with the “will” of the people, and to ensure stability over the long-term with institutions.  But what if the will of the people turns against the system? In this hemisphere, El Salvador is a case in point of a popular government that is undermining liberal democratic institutions, and is doing so with the popular will of its citizens.  How does the United States balance engagement and support for democratic governance when the people turn against it? The United States should curate a balanced approach, but the long-term goal of preserving institutions. 

American Values and Interests at Stake

For most of American history, U.S. foreign policy stood out for the promotion of a rules-based order, the right to self-determination, and the protection of human rights. From Wilson’s Fourteen Points to Franklin Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms to the post–Cold War expansion of the liberal order, the United States has promoted democratic governance abroad because it serves not only to project our values, but also to protect our security and prosperity by promoting stability and a world order in which the United States can best compete economically.

Susan Rice captured this linkage well: 

“Advancing democracy and respect for human rights is central to our foreign policy. It’s what our history and our values demand, but it’s also profoundly in our interests.”

States that respect rights and institutions are more stable partners. They ensure continuity across administrations and leaders. They generate fewer refugee flows, are less likely to breed violent extremism, and tend to be more reliable allies in trade, diplomacy, and security. By contrast, states where popular leaders dismantle institutions often spiral into cycles of corruption and crisis that cost the U.S. dearly in lost economic and business partners, security relationships, and lost credibility.

The Case of El Salvador

Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele has cultivated the image of a modern, tech-savvy reformer who “gets things done.” His tough-on-crime policies have produced genuine improvements in public safety, and many Salvadorans—justifiably exhausted by decades of violence—embrace his results-first approach. 

President Bukele can point to statistics that resonate: unemployment in 2024 fell to just 2.8% and inflation to a strikingly low 0.3%. Irregular migration to the U.S. dropped nearly 20% in 2024 compared to the previous year. These are real achievements that help explain his sky-high popularity, in addition to the real drop in crime. Those successes have to be appreciated since they are recognized by the Salvadoran people.  

President Bukele was re-elected in 2024 with an astonishing 85 percent of the vote.  He uses that popularity to justify power grabs, but popularity without institutional systems is inherently unstable. By stacking the courts with loyalists, sidelining the legislature, and ruling by emergency orders, he undermines the very system that ensures democracy and governance outlasts any one leader. The risk for the U.S. is clear: today’s “efficient populist” can become tomorrow’s authoritarian liability, producing migration surges, economic shocks, and regional instability. Without Bukele, what is El Salvador? What then would be its system of government?  A popular authoritarian leader is a cancer on the state, slowly eroding the long-term health of a country by destroying the institutions that underpinned the system through which they came to power, and on which commerce, justice, and society previously rested.  

El Salvador is not unique. Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey have both followed the same playbook: using electoral mandates to hollow out democracy while claiming the mantle of “the people’s will.” This model of “illiberal democracy” is contagious—and corrosive to the international order that has, for decades, favored American interests.  Liberal democracy is stability, even if or rather because leaders come and go. A stable system outweighs the importance of an unstable individual.  

The Trump Administration’s Approach

Rather than defend democratic legitimacy, the Trump Administration has embraced Bukele, praising him as a strong ally while overlooking his authoritarian maneuvers to dismantle institutions. This fits a broader pattern: Trump’s open admiration for Orbán and even Russian President Vladimir Putin sits uneasily beside his condemnation of Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela—a similar (now unpopular) populist authoritarian ruler, who dismantled democratic institutions.

The inconsistency is glaring. It suggests that, for Trump, legitimacy depends not on democratic norms but on personal relationships or political expediency. That opportunism sends a dangerous message: the U.S. will tolerate, even reward, leaders who gut democracy if they align with Washington. The result? A very short-sighted foreign policy that weakens America’s authority, diminishes credibility with no clear alliances, and an open invitation for autocrats everywhere to play the same game. It further erodes stable trade relationships and commercial interests.  

Engaging Popular Illiberal Leaders: Lessons for U.S. Policy

The United States faces a recurring dilemma: how to deal with leaders like Nayib Bukele or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who are currently popular domestically while weakening the institutions that make democracy legitimate. Speaking out too forcefully against a leader with strong public backing can make Washington look heavy-handed or irrelevant. Worse, it can actually strengthen those leaders by allowing them to rally nationalist sentiment against “American meddling.”  Evo Morales used this to propel his candidacy in Bolivia in 2006.

Yet silence—or worse, uncritical embrace—comes at a high cost. It signals that the U.S. confuses popularity with legitimacy, rewarding leaders who dismantle courts, muzzle the press, and undermine rights. That erodes American moral credibility, emboldens autocrats elsewhere (including those whom we don’t like), and risks long-term instability that will eventually return in the form of migration, insecurity, and broken alliances.

So how should the U.S. engage?

In the Biden Administration, following Bukele’s second inauguration, we sought to navigate this path through a coordinated approach:

1. Broaden the Relationship Beyond the President
   • Deepen ties with civil society, independent media, and other democratic institutions. Engagement should reach citizens, and work through institutions, not just their leader. In El Salvador, this meant engaging with local NGOs, the private sector, and municipal governments that provide alternative voices.
2. Be Consistent but Calibrated
   • Avoid whiplash between praise and condemnation. Quiet but firm pressure—such as having meaningful disagreements in private meetings—sets boundaries without public confrontation.  In doing so, the United States avoids seemingly opposing the will of the people. Being openly or seemingly out of touch with the population risks losing the moral authority that the U.S. carries on these issues. It undermines our ability to promote positive change when the time is right. The U.S. should also be willing to reduce or cut targeted funding that supports institutions that are violating human rights.  
3. Frame Norms as Shared Interests
   • Present democracy and human rights not as U.S. impositions but as tools for stability and prosperity. Leaders may dismiss foreigners who lecture them, but they often value international investment, trade, and credibility. Stressing that strong institutions attract capital and strengthen national security ties makes reform harder to dismiss. Having others carry this message is essential, whether it’s bond holders, corporate leaders, or others in civil society who control or influence foreign direct investment.
4. Use Multilateral Voices
   • Speaking through coalitions such as the OAS, EU, or UN dilutes the perception of unilateral interference. When multiple partners echo the same concerns, it is harder for a leader to spin it as Washington bullying.

This calibrated approach did not have enough time before President Trump was elected, but it has worked before. In South Korea during the 1980s, the U.S. nudged authoritarian allies toward democratic reforms by supporting civil society and quietly conditioning support. In the Philippines, Washington eventually backed democratic forces against Ferdinand Marcos, helping enable a peaceful transition. Even under Rodrigo Duterte, U.S. partnerships with NGOs and local leaders sustained democratic spaces without direct confrontation with the government.

A key policy consideration is that you can only walk away one time.  When the U.S. cuts relations or stops funding, the U.S. will immediately start to lose influence.  Once funding is cut, or ties are broken, then that government has fewer reasons to engage and listen.  It also opens the door for others, such as China or Russia, to fill the void.   

The lesson is clear: the U.S. cannot afford to be feckless, but neither can it be reckless. Effective engagement with popular illiberal leaders means investing in institutions that provide legitimacy while carefully managing relations with those who erode them. That balance is difficult—but abandoning it leaves America weaker, not stronger.