Joaquin Amigorena is an Argentine-Mexican-American undergraduate student at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, with regional concentrations in Latin America and East Asia. 

Introduction

The November 19th Argentine runoff election provides a sobering outlook on Argentina’s political landscape. In an electoral upset, Peronist incumbents were convincingly ousted from the Casa Rosada – not by their traditional rivals, as represented by Patricia Bullrich’s Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) – but by political newcomer Javier Milei, leader of the hyper-libertarian, alt-right La Libertad Avanza (LLA). When framing Milei within the power dynamics and political culture that have defined Argentina post-Guerra Sucia, it becomes clear that the new political leader bears a policy vision that is deeply invasive within Argentine politics. This invasiveness is critical in understanding his ascent to the presidency, the institutional obstacles likely to come his way, and his turbulent potential to reshuffle the norms of Argentine Democracy.

Pre-existing Political Culture

Traditionally, Argentina’s political arena has been contested by two broad political factions: the center-right, led most recently by Juntos por el Cambio, and the more powerful Peronist coalition, a left-leaning, albeit ideologically chameleonic political movement with deep ties to organized labor.[i] Barring three presidential administrations, Peronist politicians have entrenched themselves in Argentina’s presidential system by creating a subsistence relationship between a bloated, interventionist state and the Argentine citizenry. Their ratification of protectionist, redistributionist, and subsidy policies, while having bolstered popular support and economic growth in the short-term, exacerbated national debt, hyperinflation, and institutional corruption in the long run.[ii] [iii] [iv] While center-right opponents have provided policy alternatives centered around moderate austerity reforms, tempered public spending, and relaxed labor codes, Peronists have historically weaponized the working class’s dependency on these policies to effectively antagonize attempts at changing the status quo.[v]

Invasive Policy Alternative

Milei’s entry into Argentina’s political arena gave the Argentine electorate an invasive third choice, a scorched earth approach in dealing with its bloated state. In campaign rallies and now-viral social media posts, the politician called for the dismantling of the central bank, the closure of key government departments, and the privatization of state-owned enterprises; Milei had essentially called for the radical deconstruction of an Argentine state 80 years in the making.[vi] [vii] Milei’s electoral momentum –particularly among middle class and young male voters – was clearly a testament to the economic desperation felt by the Argentine citizenry, amidst a poverty and inflation rate of 40% and 140% respectively.[viii] [ix] It also underlined voter’s newly-held conviction that the policy alternatives offered by the “casta política” – or pre-existing political establishment – could no longer achieve much-needed, transformative change.

Institutional Obstacles

While Milei’s invasiveness was key in his rise to the Argentine presidency, it is now deterring his ambitious policy agenda while in power. Within the Argentine National Congress, Milei’s LLA holds only thirty-eight of two-hundred-fifty-seven seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and seven of seventy-two seats in the Senate.[x] To push legislation, LLA must caucus, and by extension, incorporate the policy-input of the center-right, inevitably posing constraints on the more fringe components of Milei’s policy vision. Milei is facing similar challenges when tackling Argentina’s federalist system, in which LLA holds zero governorships. This is particularly troubling when considering that provincial governors are allotted an omnipotent, caudillo-like reign over local institutions and policy enforcement. Their compliance typically requires huge swathes of government funding, a dynamic antithetical to Milei’s budget-slashing agenda.[xi] Tensions between LLA, the National Congress, and provincial governors were most recently highlighted by the Chamber of Deputies’ rejection of Milei’s ‘omnibus’ law – a massive 646-article bill designed to honor the president’s promise of dismantling elements of the Argentine state and restarting the economy via shock therapy. According to the administration, the bill’s failure was at the hands of ‘traitorous’ lawmakers from the center-right and the external sabotage of Argentine governors.[xii] Nationwide labor strikes, incited by Peronists and their union allies, pose a similar threat to the administration.[xiii] Milei and LLA’s positioning as a political newcomer, while attractive for a disgruntled electorate, is clearly a weakness when facing Argentina’s political institutions and the political parties entrenched within them.

Dissention from Democratic Norms

Milei’s political capital largely stems from his transformative economic proposals, yet an analysis of the figure cannot ignore his divisive stances on social issues inextricably tied to the norms of Argentine democracy. One of the foundational pillars of post-dictatorship Argentina has been the collective denunciation of the Military’s gross human rights record during the Guerra Sucia – a period of state terrorism inflicted by the Argentine military junta [1974-1983]. This has accordingly led to the removal of the defense establishment as a meaningful actor in domestic politics. On the campaign trail, Milei sharply dissented from this precedent, employing revisionist rhetoric that downplayed atrocities committed and venerated the role of the military.[xiii] LLA has also recently proposed legislation that would reverse Argentina’s legalization of abortion, challenging a set of legislative accomplishments centered around gender equality laws and women’s rights that have defined Argentine democracy.[xv] While institutional obstacles and political opposition may be sufficient in blocking legislative outcomes, Milei’s legitimization and platforming of these fringe viewpoints threatens to corrode the public’s faith in Argentina’s democratic norms.

Conclusion

When comparing Milei’s policy vision to Argentina’s party establishment, institutions, and democratic norms, it becomes clear that the figure represents a turbulent, invasive force within Argentine politics. While this invasiveness could be seen as a conduit for transformative change, it may be hampered by Argentina’s institutional realities and serve as a warning sign for continued political volatility, historical revisionism, and democratic backsliding. Only time – something of which Milei’s governing mandate has very little off – can tell. 

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[i]  Ocampo, Emilio. “What Kind of Populism Is Peronism?” Serie Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Centro de Estudios Macroeconómicos de Argentina (UCEMA), Buenos Aires, 732, 2020, 12. https://doi.org/https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/238357/1/732.pdf.

[ii] Fontevecchia, Agustino. “Argentina: Cristina Kirchner, Macri and Alberto Fernández – All of Them Took on Debt.” Forbes, January 19, 2021. https://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2021/01/21/argentina-cristina-kirchner-macri-and-alberto-fernndez–all-of-them-took-on-debt/?sh=143903f54272.

[iii]  Martinez, Adan. “Argentina: A Consumer Subsidy Trap.” Center for Latin American & Caribbean Studies, December 21, 2022. https://clacs.berkeley.edu/argentina-consumer-subsidy-trap.

[iv] Salama, Pierre. “Economic Growth and Inflation in Argentina under Kirchner’s Government.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011, 167-168. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2140229.

 [v] Gedan, Benjamin N. “Opinion: Much of Argentina Wants Its Populists Back.” NPR, August 10, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/08/10/748419903/opinion-much-of-argentina-wants-its-populists-back.

[vi] Buenos Aires Herald. “Milei Reveals First Privatization Plans as President-Elect.” Buenos Aires Herald, November 20, 2023. https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/milei-reveals-first-privatization-plans-as-president-elect.

[vii] Nacion, La. “El Video Viral de Tiktok Donde Javier Milei Revela Qué Ministerios Dejaría ‘Afuera’ Si Llega a Ser Presidente.” LA NACION, August 15, 2023. https://www.lanacion.com.ar/politica/el-video-viral-de-tiktok-donde-javier-milei-revela-que-ministerios-dejaria-afuera-si-llega-a-ser-nid15082023/.

[viii] “can’t buy new jeans”: Argentina inflation hits 143% as shoppers …, November 13, 2023. https://www.reuters.com/business/retail-consumer/cant-buy-new-jeans-argentinas-100-inflation-draws-crowds-used-clothes-markets-2023-11-13/.

[ix] “Incidencia de La Pobreza y La Indigencia En 31 Aglomerados Urbanos.” Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y Censos , September 27, 2023. https://www.indec.gob.ar/uploads/informesdeprensa/eph_pobreza_09_2326FC0901C2.pdf.

[x] Jütten, Marc. “Argentina: Outcome of the 2023 Elections – Beginning of a New Era?: Think Tank: European Parliament.” Think Tank | European Parliament, November 2023. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EPRS_ATA(2023)754610.

[xi] Kingstone, Peter. “Carlos Scartascini, Ernesto H. Stein and Mariano Tommasi, Eds., How Democracy Works: Political Institutions, Actors, and Arenas in Latin American Policymaking. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2010. Tables, Bibliography, Index, 333 Pp.; Paperback $29.95.” Latin American Politics and Society 54, no. 1 (2012): 207–9. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1531426x00000108.

[xii] Centenera, Mar. “Argentina’s Javier Milei Declares War on the Opposition after His Mega-Bill to Dismantle the State Is Rejected.” EL PAÍS English, February 7, 2024. https://english.elpais.com/international/2024-02-07/argentinas-javier-milei-declares-war-on-the-opposition-after-his-megalaw-to-dismantle-the-state-is-rejected.html.

[xiii] Soltys, Martin. “Protests, Strikes, Unions ‘on Alert’: Unrest against Milei’s Government Grows.” Buenos Aires Times, February 23, 2024. https://batimes.com.ar/news/argentina/strikes-in-different-sectors-and-the-cgt-in-a-state-of-alert-the-first-73-days-of-mileis-government.phtml.

[xv] Grinspan, Lautaro. “Will Milei Rewrite Argentina’s History?” Foreign Policy, December 14, 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/14/argentina-milei-dictatorship-junta-memory-human-rights/.

[xvi] EFE, Agencia. “Milei’s Party Presents Draft Bill to Repeal Argentina Abortion Law.” EFE Noticias, February 8, 2024. https://efe.com/en/latest-news/2024-02-08/mileis-party-presents-draft-bill-to-repeal-argentina-abortion-law/.