Pedro Huet
When analyzing the victory of Javier Milei, many analysts appeal to Argentina’s recent history. In general, it follows similar trends to many Latin American countries: political instability during the early 20th century, decades of military dictatorships, uneasy democratization at the end of the century, and an upsurge in populism during the 21st century.[i] Argentina, like several other Latin American states, has seen a cyclical election of presidents who employ a left-wing populist rhetoric, followed by others who employ a right-wing approach, or vice versa.[ii] Although many scholars have focused on these trends to analyze the country’s current democratic situation, few have focused on a unique quality of the country’s political system: the coexistence of democracy and populism.
The term populism can be defined as a political strategy in which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on support from a large number of unorganized followers, via a charismatic quasi-personal connection with them[iii]. It is often accompanied by a confrontational rhetoric that accuses the incumbent government of being corrupt and caters to an idealized popular identity. Due to the incendiary nature of its rhetoric and its reliance on a single figure, it tends to divide the population (i.e. the just against the corrupt), allows the populists to abuse their political influence, and results in the enactment of what is considered politically and economically extreme[iv]. Given how deleterious to social stability these effects can be, it is unsurprising that these controversial politicians and their movements often cause a severe erosion of democracy by replacing democratic institutions with strong nationalist ideas and a cult-like loyalty to charismatic political figures.[v]
In Argentina, however, we see different effects compared to other countries. Elsewhere, populist movements erode democracy, but in Argentina they seem to coexist. During the greater part of the 20th century, the country experienced a series of coup d’états that brought unstable military juntas into power. During this period, populist politicians, like Juan Domingo Peron, were the only leaders capable of implementing democratic processes in the country for a limited amount of time.[vi] Decades later, when the junta regimes were discredited and the country’s elites committed to adhering to democratic processes, it was these strong, unconventional and charismatic populist leaders that played a key role in preserving democracy. For example, Carlos Menem and Nestor Kirchner, amassed high approval ratings and support for their elected platforms at times in which most Argentine households were facing economic hardships and seemed to be questioning the effectiveness of the new political system, nurturing popular representation in the country.[vii] Last year, we saw a general election in which an incumbent and his opponent used populism to appeal to the masses with their incendiary rhetoric and harsh criticisms. The process resulted in Argentina’s government being again shaped by a democratic transition: the winner was named president of Argentina and the loser accepted the results.[viii]
This is not to say that populist politicians in Argentina have not taken detrimental actions to the country’s democracy. However, transitions of power in Argentina after 1983 have followed a consistent trend: the party in power responds to the population’s choice above the disruptive ideas, messages and personalities of their representatives.
This implies political sophistication among Argentine voters: they may be treating populist rhetoric as simply another characteristic of a candidate, considering it as any other trait, economic policy, political ideology, track-record, and so on. Argentine voters are not blinded by the promises or the cult of these leaders, so politicians can´t fall back on this technique to stay in office. There are various signs that populists in power have not severely damaged the country’s democratic process, be it due to unwillingness or inability. On one hand, the last three General Argentine Elections (2015, 2019 and 2023) have seen peaceful democratic transitions of power between opposing parties, which means that the electorate’s choice decides who governs. One the other hand, staunch international democracy measures, such as the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index, display Argentina’s democracy score mostly unchanged during the last seventeen years, actually showing a slight increase (3%) in democracy during said time period[ix]. This could very well imply that, in Argentina, democratic elections are seen as the only game in town.[x]
Given this trend, we should expect that Javier Milei’s election and presidency will likely be just another chapter in Argentina’s democratic history. If his unorthodox policies[xi] don’t improve the country’s precarious economic position, voters will likely penalize him if or when he seeks a second term.
Notes
[i] Nicolás Cachanosky and Alexandre Padilla, “Latin American Populism in the Twenty-First Century”, The Independent Review, 24(2) https://www.jstor.org/stable/45216633, 210 – 214.
[ii] Carolina Salgado and Paula Sandrin, “Pink Tide”then a“Turn to the Right”: Populisms and extremism in Latin America in the twenty‐first century” In B. De Souza Guilherme, C. Ghymers, S. Griffith‐Jones, & A. RibeiroHoffmann (eds.), Financial crisis management and democracy (266 – 268), Springer International Publishing, 2021, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54895-7_17
[iii] Kurt Weyland, “Clarifying a Contested Concept: Populism in the Study of Latin American Politics”, Comparative Politics 34, no. 1 (2001): 12 – 14. https://doi.org/10.2307/422412.
[iv] Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, “Understanding Populism.” In Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2019), 10 – 12. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108595841
[v] Christian Houle and Paul D. Kenny, “The Political and Economic Consequences of Populist Rule in America”. Government and Opposition 53(2), (2018), 279 – 280. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/political-and-economic-consequences-of-populist-rule-in-latin-america/DF3D269BA3D964CCDED5B07B0EA380B5?utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=copy_link&utm_source=bookmark
[vi] Enrique Peruzzotti, “Peronism and the Birth of Modern Populism.” Journal of Inter-Regional Studies: Regional and Global Perspectives (JIRS), vol 2, 2019, pp. 5 – 6, https://www.waseda.jp/inst/oris/assets/ uploads/2018/03/04_Peronism-and-the-Birth-of-Modern-Populism_ Enrique-Peruzzotti.pdf
[vii] María Fernanda Arias, “Charismatic Leadership and the Transition to Democracy: The Rise of Carlos Saul Menem in Argentine Politics”, Texas Papers on Latin America, 95(2), (1995), Working Paper, https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/items/ae24a976-d560-43a6-8681-03d7b3eb6bd2
[viii] Nicolas Misculin, “ Argentina President-elect Milei meets outgoing Fernandez after election win”, Reuters, November 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-president-elect-milei-meets-outgoing-fernandez-after-election-win-2023-11-21/
[ix] Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2022: Frontline democracy and the battle for Ukraine. Retrieved from http://www.gapm.io/dxlsdemocrix on February 2, 2023.
[x] Juan José Linz and Alfred C Stepan. “Toward Consolidated Democracies”, Journal of Democracy, 7(2), (1996), 14-15. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.1996.0031.
[xi] Javier Baez, “ Milei proposes paying salaries in Argentina with Bitcoin, meat and even milk”, News Breezer, December 25, 2025, https://newsbeezer.com/mexicoeng/milei-proposes-paying-salaries-in-argentina-with-bitcoin-meat-and-even-milk/
Democracy & Society 